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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/05/2006

Accident number: 214

Accident time: 07:15

Accident Date: 10/07/1998

Where it occurred: Aleksa Santic School,
West Sarajevo

Country: Bosnia Herzegovina

Primary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: WL/WM/SB

Date of main report: 18/07/1998
Name of source: BiH MAC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
dry/dusty
grass/grazing area
hard
metal fragments

Date record created: 16/02/2004

Date last modified: 16/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: Sarajevo

Map series: WGS 84 2782 1

Map edition: 9-DMA

Map sheet: M709

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
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Accident report
The demining group were operating in three-man teams working with one-man drills
described as "work-rest-standby", changing role at 30 minute intervals.
A Board of Inquiry report was ordered by the country MAC and carried out by the chairman
of the regional MAC and a representative from the overseas funder. A representative from
the demining company involved was present. The report was made available and the
following summarises its content. The full report (edited for anonymity) is under Related
papers at the “Other documents” tab. The investigators were not able to interview the Site
QA monitor and no report was received from his group.
The accident occurred in an area that was flat and grass covered with occasional low
bushes. The ground was described as "hard and dry". There was considerable metal
contamination and the normal requirement to remove all metal had been varied. In this case
all metal signatures by the detector had to be investigated, but if the deminer was satisfied
that the reading was not from a mine the metal could be left. The mine involved in the
accident was identified as a PMA-3 by fragments found in the crater, the shape of the crater,
and other mines found nearby. 50 PMA-3 mines had been found at the task site and most of
these were "surface laid".
Dogs were used at the site "first thing each morning to check access lanes and last thing
each afternoon as a quality control measure. Dogs also remained at the site to check areas
after they had been cleared manually by deminers."
The tools available to the victim included a small trowel that the investigators said "was not a
robust tool", hedge-cutting shears, the Schiebel AN 19/2 detector and "a standard manual
prodding tool". The end-of-lane marking stick [called a "base stick" in this theatre] was
shorter than required and not marked with the graded "prodding guide" required. The Team
Leader carried the detector test piece, so the victim could not check its operation himself.
The investigators found that it "appeared to function correctly".
The method used in the area was to first use the metal detector to "sweep over the top of
high grass" (30cm or more in photographs) looking for PROM, TMRP-6 mines and tripwires.
Then the deminer cut the grass with the shears before making a second detector sweep.
Finally the deminer must prod over the entire area "because the metal detector could not
always find buried PMA-3 mines”.
The demining operation was working in three teams in different parts of the mined area with
a Control Point in a nearby school playground. The Control Point was not marked in
accordance with the group's SOPs, but they explained that they had cleared the playground
at the start of the task [it was not clear why it should not be marked]. There was no marked
access route from the Control Point to the working areas.
The team started work at 06:00 the victim's partner located a PMA-3 and the Team Leader
"dealt with this". At 07:00 the victim began his shift. After five minutes he located a PMA-3
and the Team Leader "dealt with this". At approximately 07:15 the victim stepped on a PMA3 and it exploded. The victim's statement says that he was "in a position half on a knee of
ground" with his prod when the mine exploded.
The injuries were described as "minor damage to…right foot. It was stated that "no
permanent injuries were sustained". The investigators believe that the victim's "stout boots"
saved him from more serious injury. They also believed that the groin protection provided by
his protective trousers prevented injury to his body because there was superficial blast
damage on the collar, groin and lower legs. [Damage to the cotton cover of the collar and
groin area was shown in a photograph in the file.] A photograph of the lower-leg protection
showed non penetrative damage to the cover and inner. A photograph of the victim's boot
showed it split along the inside.
The medic was about 100 metres away from the accident site. He gave first aid and the
victim was taken to the general hospital.
An investigation of the crater led the investigators to conclude that the mine had probably
been at a depth of around 10cm, but the uneven ground made it hard to be sure.
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Conclusion
The investigators concluded that there was room for improvement in the tools used on site.
They found that the Schiebel AN19/2 could find PMA-3 mines to 6cm but may not have been
"capable of finding the mine involved in this incident".

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that the demining company issue each deminer with a test
piece for his detector, that they try other detectors (which they were doing during the drafting
of the report), that improved end-of-lane markers be used, that 100% metal clearance be
attempted anywhere that a detector could be used, and where detectors could not be used
and prodding to 10cm was not possible - excavation should be carried out. [See Analysis.]
The recommendations also included advice to consider using a bayonet or "small shovel" to
replace the trowel, to mark prodders to indicate depth, and to use one-handed shears for
better control. They added that refresher training should be carried out and that the site
Monitor should always be present for a site investigation.
DISTRIBUTION
Senior Technical Adviser BH MAC
Director Federation MAC
[Demining group]
US State Department
Federation PIU

Victim Report
Victim number: 276

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet,
Short visor, Leggings

Helmet
Short visor
Trousers/leggings

Summary of injuries:
minor Foot
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Inadequate equipment" because it appears
that the victim was provided with an inadequate detector and handtools. The secondary
cause is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because the provision of
inappropriate equipment is a management responsibility.
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The investigators recommended marking a prodder to show when a depth of ten centimetres
had been achieved. They seem not to have realised that to achieve a depth of 10cm at 30º
to the ground surface requires a penetration of 20cm - which in my experience is impossible
on all but loose sand without exerting excessive force. Pushing the blade 10cm into the
ground at 30º achieves a depth of only 5cm.

The injuries resulting from stepping on a PMA-3 vary from bruising to traumatic amputations.
The picture above shows why this happens. It shows a cut-away section through a PMA-3.
The 35g Tetryl is in the top and centre of the mine. The area of pressure-plate surrounding
the HE is actually larger than the area of pressure-plate over it. If a victim is fortunate, they
step on the pressure plate but the explosive charge is not beneath their foot.

Related papers
The Accident file included photographs of the site and the crater, and a crude sketch of the
working area. It also contained a document stating that the regional MAC recommended only
the Foerster MINEX 4, Guartel MD8, MineLab F1A4 and Vallon ML 1620B detectors.

Original BoI report
What follows is the original BoI report, edited for anonymity. There are striking similarities
between it and the BoI report for the accident on 27th June 1998.

Original BoI report
What follows is the original BoI report, edited for anonymity.

REPORT OF BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO ACCIDENT 10 JULY 1998
18 July 1998

References:
Map WGS 84 2782-1 M709 Edition 9-DMA – Sarajevo.
RONCO SOPs dated 1 December 1997.
UN MAC Technical and Safety Standards Guidelines Dated 17 June 1998.

INTRODUCTION
1.

As a result of a mine accident on 10 July 1998, a Board of Inquiry was convened by
the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre to investigate the accident on behalf
of the Government and in accordance with the national Technical Guidelines.

2.

This is the second mine accident on the same site within two weeks. The accidents
are not related but there are some similarities between the two.
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3.

The recommendations from the last accident report were accepted by [Demining
group] senior management and are currently under consideration for implementation.
MAC will seek confirmation of action taken as part of normal monitoring visits to
[Demining group] sites during the near future.

4.

The Board comprised:
a. Chairman - BH MAC
b. Member – United States State Department
c.
[Name excised] representing [Demining group] Corporation was
present throughout the Board of Inquiry investigation and interviews at the task
site.

5.

A copy of the Board's Terms of Reference are attached at Annex A

6.

[Demining group] staff members were helpful and cooperative throughout the course
of the investigation. [The demining group was an international commercial company
operating with a National commercial company.]

SEQUENCE, DOCUMENTATION AND PROCEDURES OF TASKING
7.

[Demining group] were tasked by the PIU in accordance with the provisions of their
contract and had been provided with information on known minefields in the area by
BH MAC prior to the commencement of work. This Task was number 570.

GEOGRAPHY
8.

The task site where [Demining group] were operating is a rectangular grassed area
next to the Aleksa Santic children’s school in Nedzarici, West Sarajevo.

9.

The site is generally flat and grassed, with a line of trees on two sides, and
occasional bushes throughout the area. The nearest buildings are on two sides of the
area, approximately 20 metres and 200 metres away. The ground was hard and dry.
A sketch plan of the site is shown at Annex B. Photographs of the site are shown at
Annex D.

PRIORITY OF TASK
10.

The site is next to the Aleksa Santic children’s school and close to a residential area.
Priority was set by the Federation PIU.

SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING
11.

A plan of the site is attached at Annex B showing the areas of clearance. Marking in
clearance lanes was adequate.

12.

The team was split into three parties and worked in different sections of their
allocated areas of the site. Each clearance lane was worked by one three-man team,
working a work-rest-standby schedule of operations at half-hourly intervals.

13.

The Control Point for the team was situated next to the children’s playground at the
school. The CP was not marked in accordance with [Demining group] SOPs. It was
stated that this was because the team had cleared the area at the start of the task.

14.

There was no marked Access Route from the Control Point to the clearance lanes.
From the ground markings it was obvious that a single route was used between the
Control Point and the Start Points.

15.

Marking of the area between cleared and uncleared areas was by use of one-metre
high red topped stakes. Red and white nylon cord was fixed between the stakes.

16.

Points where mines had been discovered earlier were marked with one-metre high
blue topped stakes.

SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE
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17.

[Demining group] have seven teams working in this regional area. Managerial staff
visit sites regularly and a supervisory structure as shown below assists in the
maintenance of standards. These supervisors were either permanently stationed at
the task site or visited the task site frequently, daily or every second day. The
[Demining group] Regional Manager, [Name excised], last visited the site on the
morning of the accident at approximately 0630hrs. The site was running normally at
that time.
a. Sprind Regional Manager

-

b. Operations Officer
c.

Regular visits.
-

Deputy Operations Officer

-

d. Team Leader
site.

Regular visits.

Regular visits.
-

Permanently on

18.

Operations Manager. [Name excised] [Demining group] Operations Manager also
visited the site from time to time as part of his operational responsibilities.

19.

PIU Representative. PIU monitors rotate between sites and teams on a monthly
basis. Every task site has a PIU monitor deployed to it at all times when operations
are in progress. The current Site Monitor was [name excised]. The PIU Site Monitor
was not available for interview during the investigation and no report was received
from PIU.

QUALITY ASSURANCE
20.

Part of the Quality Assurance process is the presence at each site of Site Monitors
employed by the Regional PIU, as stated above. The role of the Site Monitor is to
ensure that the contractor carries out the work as agreed with the PIU, particularly
with respect to working methods, safety and effectiveness.

COMMUNICATIONS
21.

[Demining group] radio communications network is comprehensive and works well.
Each team leader has a hand held VHF radio and is able to speak direct to all levels
of Supervision including [Demining group] base at Sprind.

22.

VHF radios are supplemented by vehicle-mounted HF radios. [Demining group]
regional office is equipped with a base station and PTT telephones.

23.

On this site the medic was responsible for radio communications to the [Demining
group] Regional Office. The site radio log shows that on the morning of the accident
the medic had confirmed communications at 0620hrs.

MEDICAL
24.

Three medics were at the site at the time of the accident. Each was equipped with a
comprehensive medical and trauma kit. One ambulance was at the site.

25.

The Team medic, [name excised] responded to the scene of the accident from the
Medical Aid Point at the Control Point, approximately 100 metres away. He had a full
trauma medical kit and stretcher. After initial first aid the casualty was evacuated to
the Kosovo General Hospital.

26.

The injured deminer was [the victim]. Injuries were minor damage to [his] right foot.
No serious or permanent injuries were sustained. The injured deminer was wearing
stout working boots. It is the opinion of the board that these boots saved [the victim]
from more serious injury and that the groin protection provided by his ballistic trousers
saved further injury to the body.

27.

Casualty Evacuation after the accident was reported as successful and efficient.
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PERSONALITIES INVOLVED
28.

Team involved in the accident was Team No. 1. This team comprised more members
than is usual for a [Demining group] demining team. Extra deminers were deployed to
the team because it was anticipated that most of the work involved would be manual
clearance drills.
a. Team Leader
b. Deputy team Leader
c. Medic
d. No. 1 Deminer sustained injuries.
e. No. 2 Deminer
f. No. 3 Deminer
g. Deminer
h. Deminer
i. Deminer
j.
Dog handlers
k. Mine Detection Dogs

EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS
29.

The injured deminer was carrying a small trowel. This was not a robust tool and was
not efficient at removing turf from the area when digging.

30.

A base-stick was in use in the clearance lane. The base-stick was cut short by
approximately 15 centimetres and it was not marked with gradations to assist the
deminer in gauging the distance required between prods.

31.

The injured deminer was using garden hedge-cutting shears to cut the grass in the
clearance lane.

32.

Metal detector used by the team was a Schiebel AN-19/2. During an on-site test it
appeared to function correctly. It remains normal practice in [Demining group] teams
for the Team Leader to test the metal detector and carry the test piece, as stated in
the report for the last accident.

33.

Because the area is heavily contaminated with metal fragments and shrapnel, 100%
metal-free clearance is currently considered as unreasonable or impractical. If the
metal detector gives a signal, the area of the signal is prodded. If the deminer decides
at this point that the signal is not a mine, the fragment or shrapnel piece is left and the
operation moves forward. If it is decided that the signal could be a mine, normal
excavation drills are carried out.

34.

An informal on-site evaluation showed that the Schiebel would detect a PMA-3 fuze
buried in the ground near the clearance lane at a depth of 6 centimetres.

35.

The injured deminer was using a standard manual prodding tool. Team Leader states
that, in this lane, normal prodding depth was to five or six centimetres.

DETAILS OF MINE INVOLVED
36.

The mine involved was a PMA-3 Anti Personnel blast mine. This was confirmed by
fragments around the crater, other mines found nearby and the size and shape of the
crater. Photographs of the crater are shown at Annex E.

37.

Blue-topped stakes were placed in the ground at the site, approximately 3 metres
from the point of the accident, to show exact locations where five similar mines had
been removed. These were all within an area approximately two metres long by one
metre wide. Eighteen more mines had been found within ten metres of the point of
the accident.

38.

A total of more than fifty PMA-3 mines had been found at this task site. Most of these
mines were surface-laid.
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39.

Deminers at the task site stated that the mine was buried so deep that the Schiebel
metal detector in use could not locate it. The crater left after the explosion was
symmetrical in shape and depth, commensurate with a conventionally laid mine at a
depth of approximately 10 centimetres. Precise depth of this particular mine is difficult
to assess because the ground on one side of the crater is approximately ten
centimetres higher than ground on the other side.

40.

A PROM-1 bounding fragmentation mine had also been found by [Demining group]
on this area. A TMRP-6 Anti-Tank mine, fitted with a tilt-rod and a tripwire and laid on
its side, was also found nearby, approximately ten metres from the point of the
accident.

EVIDENCE OF RE-MINING
41.

There was no evidence or suspicion of re-mining at any part of the task site.

DRESS & PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
42.

Each member of the Demining Team was equipped with a helmet with a visor
attached and a ballistic jacket. The injured deminer was wearing a helmet with visor,
ballistic jacket and ballistic trousers at the time of the explosion.

43.

Examination of these items of protective equipment showed approximately fifty
superficial holes from blast damage. These were in the collar, groin and lower right
and left leg areas. There were no perforations through the protective suit. Because
the deminer was wearing full-protective trousers as part of his protective suit, his
injuries were probably less than they would have been if he had been wearing only a
“flap” style groin protector.

44.

The injured deminer was wearing standard working boots. The right boot was
damaged in the blast. The boots probably saved the deminer from further injuries.

45.

Photographs of injured deminer’s Personal Protective Equipment are shown at Annex
F.

USE OF DOGS
46.

Because of the amount of mines known to be in the area, Mine Detecting Dogs are
usually used at the site only first thing each morning, to check access lanes and last
thing each afternoon, as a quality control measure. Dogs also remained at the site to
check areas after they had been cleared manually by the deminers.

47.

[Demining group] Regional Manager states that there were six dogs on the site at the
time of the accident and these were available throughout every day at the site.

DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES ON DAY OF ACCIDENT
48.

The following account summarises the responses to questions by members of the
Board, directed to members of the Supervisors, Team Leader and team members.
Statements are shown at Annex C.

49.

The team started work on the morning of the accident at the usual time of 0600hrs.

50.

Demining operations progressed as normal throughout the morning before the
accident.

51.

At approximately 0645hrs, the then No. 1 deminer, [name excised], reported that he
had discovered a PMA-3 mine in the clearance lane. The team leader dealt with this
and at about 0700hrs [the victim] took over as the No. 1 deminer in the clearance
lane.

52.

Approximately five minutes into his shift [the victim] discovered a PMA-3 The team
leader dealt with this and [the victim] then went back to work. A few minutes after this,
[the victim] stepped on the mine that injured him.
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53.

Accident occurred at approximately 0715hrs.

54.

[Demining group] Regional Manager reports that normal manual clearance operations
on this site involved the following sequence:

55.

a.

Metal detector sweep over top of high grass. Although this would not find any
PMA mines, this was used in order to locate any PROM mines and any TMRP-6
anti-tank mines or tilt rods.

b.

Cut grass and vegetation using two-handed garden shears.

c.

Second metal detector sweep.

d.

Search with manual prodder over entire area. It was stated that this was
because the metal detector would not always find buried PMA-3 mines.

Manual and visual searching throughout supported this procedure.

SUMMARY
56.

The area where this accident occurred is very heavily contaminated with mines. Most
mines on the area were laid on the surface, the main problem lies with buried PMA-3
mines and with the high level of fragments and shrapnel at the site. One accident has
already occurred on the area. Schiebel metal detector in use at the site probably
could not have located the mine involved in the accident. Evidence shows that the
mine involved was probably laid conventionally. Injuries sustained by the one deminer
involved were minor and a full recovery is expected.

CONCLUSIONS
57.

Supervision and management procedures at the site were sufficient. Medical and
safety coverage was in place and worked well. Drills and procedures should be
reviewed. Tools used at the site could be improved.

58.

The Schiebel AN19-2 metal detectors in use at the site are capable of finding PMA-3
mines in this area only at shallow depths, up to 6 centimetres deep. It is not certain
whether the metal detectors used on this site were capable of finding the mine
involved in this accident.

RECOMMENDATIONS
59.

This area should be regarded as exceptionally high-risk. SOP drills and management
supervision should be applied with utmost care and precision. Progress at the site
should be anticipated as very slow.

60.

Other types of metal detectors held as stock by [Demining group] should be trialled
on the area to attempt to find a better performance than what the Schiebel currently
provides. If this is successful, deminers should be encouraged to use the more
appropriate detector.

61.

Note. During the drafting of this report, [Demining group] have tested MD-8 and
MINELAB metal detectors on the area. Comparisons have been made with the
Schiebel detector in use at the time of the accident and this evaluation will be used by
[Demining group] in the selection of metal detectors to be used in the future.

62.

Improved, full-length base-sticks should be used. These should be marked with
gradations at 2.5 centimetre intervals and 10 centimetres at the ends should be
brightly coloured to show where lanes overlap.

63.

100% metal clearance should be aimed for in all areas where metal detectors are
used. All signals given by the metal detector should be investigated.

64.

Where necessary lanes should be sapped to provide a base from which to search for
buried mines. Consideration should also be given to marking prodder blades to show
depth of penetration into the ground.
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65.

Deminer No. 1 should be equipped with a better trowel or small shovel than is
currently issued. The use of a strong-bladed bayonet or similar tool should also be
considered to assist in excavation of areas of ground where metal detector signals
are received.

66.

Consider the use of dogs to check lanes as part of the changeover procedure
between deminer shift changes.

67.

Retraining should be carried out to confirm the following points.
•

Manual prodding techniques.

•

Procedures and use of metal detectors, including the confirmation of a
second sweep over the clearance area in front of the base stick, after the
grass has been cut.

68.

In areas where the metal detector is ineffective, Prodding should be to a depth of 10
centimetres. Where this is not possible, and dogs or mechanical devices cannot be
used, excavation is required.

69.

After any accident at a demining site, the PIU monitor should always be available
throughout the course of any investigation.

COMMENTS BY THE BOARD
70.

All areas used by a demining team as administrative areas, rest places, control points
etc. should be marked with pickets and tape, in accordance with page 16 of the
National Technical Guidelines. This marking should be particularly applied to access
lanes.

71.

The use of two-handed shears for cutting vegetation should be discouraged. This
should especially be the case in areas where mines with protruding fuzes or tripwires
are suspected. The use of two-handed garden shears provides less control than
smaller, one handed shears.
Consideration should be given to the use of metal detectors approved by MAC. MAC
recommends only the following metal detectors.
Vallon ML1620B
Foerster MINEX 4
Guartel MD8
Minelab F1A4

72.

As stated in the last accident report, every operator should be in possession of a testpiece for the metal detector. It should be the operator’s responsibility to test his own
detector at least every ten minutes.

Signed: Operations Coordinator, BH MAC, United States State department, Sarajevo

Annex A
Annex B
Annex C
Annex D
Annex E
Annex

–
–
–
–
F

Terms of Reference.
Sketch map of site.
Statements of team members.
Photographs of site.
Photographs of crater.
Photographs of Personal Protective Equipment.

DISTRIBUTION
Senior Technical Adviser BH MAC
Director Federation MAC
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[Demining group]
US State Department
Federation PIU
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